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Knowledge, says Plato in Republic V, is ‘a power, the strongest of them all’ 
(477d9), comparing it to the other mental powers, which ‘enable us to do whatever 
we are capable of doing’, e.g. opinion, sight, hearing, etc. (c1-3)  Plato makes the 
astonishing claim that knowledge is a different power from belief (b5-6), in the 
way, for example, that sight is different from hearing.  I will argue that this is a 
fundamentally different conception of knowledge and belief, unique in the history 
of philosophy, showing them to have a high level of independence from each other.   
 
The power-analysis of knowledge is different from the positions Plato explores in 
his earlier and later works.  Specifically, it is a one-off experiment that is sharply in 
contrast with the positions he considers in the Meno and in the Theaetetus.  These 
positions are attempts to analyse knowledge in terms of true belief plus an external 
condition that distinguishes it from mere true belief.  But on the Republic V 
account, knowledge is not a species of belief, any more than sight is a species of 
hearing.  By contrast, the Republic V position on knowledge can be through of as 
compatible with the Meno/Phaedo account of learning as recollecting our 
knowledge of the Forms.  Whether we think of such knowledge of the Forms as 
innate knowledge, or as a special apprehension the soul has of the Forms before 
birth, this conception does not invite the analysis of knowledge into true belief with 
an account.
1
   
 
I will further show how knowledge of the Forms, according to Plato in Republic V, 
enriches our understanding in the realm of belief.  By contrast, even if belief, on the 
recollection account, triggers the occurrence of pre-existing knowledge, belief does 
not enrich our knowledge.   
 
Treating knowledge and belief as distinct powers of the mind which operate 
differently from, and independently of one another did not take root in philosophy 
after Plato, which may be because of the enormous impact of the Theaetetus on 
later epistemology.  It may also be that philosophers associated the power-analysis 
of knowledge to knowledge of the Forms, so if it is to be found anywhere in the 
generations of philosophers that followed, if would be limited within the circles of 
influence of Platonic metaphysics, which is much narrower than the impact of 
Plato’s later epistemology.  Furthermore, although the epistemological position is 
succinctly delineated in Book V of the Republic, it is overshadowed by the impact 
that this argument had on subsequent generations of philosophers as an argument 
for ontology.  Philosophers who visited the Book V knowledge-belief argument 
became preoccupied with the doctrine of the degrees of reality, which was the focus 
of attention even within the 20
th
 Century Platonic exegesis about the argument.   
                                                 
1
 I will not explore here the relation of the Republic V account of knowledge and the accounts of the 
later books of the Republic.  Allan Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence, Princeton University Press, 
2002, pp. 65-78, finds associations here between the present account and those of the three similes, as 
well as the account of the argument from perception of Republic VII.  I will not discuss the relation of 
theses accounts here.   
 
Plato did not explore the implications of knowledge’s ontological and functional 
independence from belief in his Republic V account.  Nor has subsequent 
epistemology explored the explanatory possibilities afforded by the status of 
knowledge as an independent mental capacity from belief.  It is only the 
developments in recent epistemology that have resulted from Williamson’s theory 
of the primitiveness and priority of knowledge
2
 that have sharpened our sensitivity 
to the explanatory potential of not analysing knowledge in terms of belief.  My 
hope is that highlighting and examining this strand of Plato’s thought in Republic V 
will generate a broader search for the lineage of the position in Plato’s works and in 
the works of his followers.   
 
What Plato experiments here on is what follows if belief is a different power than 
knowledge, with different objects and different operation from knowledge.  Belief 
in the present context is like a multiply fractured mirror, reflecting inadequately in a 
fragmented way what reality is like, so that e.g. instead of seeing the desk with 
books on it, we see bits of brown, blue and white surfaces.  Knowledge has a 
different access to reality than belief does, such that what is accessed by knowledge 
is different from what belief can access.  This may seem contrary to common sense, 
but the idea behind it is not – what one unearths depends of her excavation method.  
The content of a scientist’s knowledge that friction produces heat is very different 
from the belief content of an uneducated person that friction produces heat.  Plato’s 
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power-analysis of knowledge is a first attempt to explain this difference.  
Knowledge reaches the roots of the phenomena around us, and the roots in their 
turn play a role in the re-individuation and the re-identification of the phenomena.   
 
In the present account, Plato says that knowledge and belief operate differently, the 
first infallibly and second fallibly.  This has invariably been taken to mean that 
knowledge is always true while belief is sometimes true and sometimes false.  But 
this is not what Plato tells us in this argument.  On the reading I propose here, all 
knowledge is true, while every belief is both true and false.  This is the sense in 
which belief is fallible.  This aspect of Plato’s theory remained latent in the 
scholarly tradition because we adopted the ‘justified true belief’ conception of 
knowledge, from which it immediately followed that true belief is the common 
denominator between knowledge and belief.  On such an understanding, knowledge 
and true belief share the same content, which requires some beliefs to be only true, 
not true and false.  This became axiomatic in our conception of belief for two and a 
half millennia.  Plato’s conception of belief in Republic V is antithetical to it; belief 
falls short of capturing the content of knowledge, and in the content it does capture 
it always falls short of capturing unadulterated truth.  Belief is fallible in that every 
belief captures only impure truths.   
 
In this paper I will be concerned with two tasks.  The one is to examine the problem 
of the ontological status of the objects of knowledge, belief, and ignorance, as 
described in the argument of Republic V.  This has been a source of intense 
controversy in the literature because of demands that appear to make inconsistent 
claims about the objects of the cognitive powers.  I argue that we can make sense of 
the recalcitrant passages that have defied a consistent reading under the existential, 
the veridical, and the predicative interpretations of the argument.  My second task is 
to delineate with as much exactitude as is afforded by Plato’s descriptions the 
ontological status of, and relations between knowledge and belief.  This becomes 
more challenging because of the metaphorical descriptions Plato resorts to 
frequently in this passage, which resist precision.  Nevertheless, I will try to show 
that there is enough philosophical content in this argument for an outline of an 
account of knowledge and belief.   
 
The Consequences of Lacking Knowledge  
The Knowledge-Belief Argument  of Republic V begins with Plato’s concern to 
distinguish the cognitive state of the philosopher from that of a person of culture 
who is confined to experiential stimulation alone.  The significance of this 
distinction is to describe the level of knowledge and understanding that will be 
reached by the guardian who is successfully educated and trained to rule the city.  
In the process, Plato brings together his epistemology and his ontology, correlating 
epistemic states to ontological domains.  The preliminary discussion of the 
argument lays the foundation for the distinctions that follow and is telling for the 
reading of the argument I am putting forward here.   
 
Plato describes the cognitive state of the cultural connoisseur, whom he calls a sight 
lover, as that of ‘living in a dream’.  He says three things about her.  The first two 
describe the ability and the cognitive achievement of the sight lover, as: 
someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn't believe in the beautiful 
itself and isn't able to follow anyone who could lead him to the knowledge of 
it? Don't you think he is living in a dream rather than a wakened state?  
(476c2-4)   
 
The sight lover does not have a conception of the Form of Beauty, but only of the 
beautiful things around her.  Secondly, the sight lover is not capable of having even 
a conception of the Form of Beauty – presumably because of her luck of 
appropriate training and education.  She does not have the capacity to abstract away 
from the instances of Beauty and conceive of Beauty itself.  Plato describes this 
state as living in a dream.  This description is rather surprising, because one would 
not have thought that we would describe someone’s state as dreamlike just because 
they are unaware of some portion of reality or lacking some knowledge.  This 
would hardly exclude anybody from being in a dreamlike state.  The surprise is 
reinforced by the continuation of the characterisation which offers a rough 
explanation of dreaming:  
Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a 
likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like?   
I certainly think that someone who does that is dreaming.  (476c4-7)   
This conception of dreaming, namely taking what is not the case to be the case – in 
this instance by mistaking one thing for another – it is not what Plato called 
dreaming in the previous sentence (476c2-4, quoted above) which the current 
sentence purports to explain.  The second case of dreaming is not deemed dreaming 
because one lacks some knowledge, as was the case in the first example; it is 
deemed dreaming because of making a mistake – taking an instance of Beauty for 
the From of Beauty.  This latter state contains confusion and error.  Yet, in the 
previous example it was the lack of a concept and the inability to acquire it that had 
been described as an instance of dreaming, which is not a confusion or an error.  
How then can Plato describe dreaming in such incompatible terms within the same 
context?   
 
To understand the relevance of the two explanations of dreaming to each other we 
need to look at the consequence of the incapacity of the sight lover to acquire the 
conception of the Form of Beauty.  The implication must be that it is not an 
innocent absence of knowledge.  The lack of the concept of the Form of Beauty has 
an impact on her conception of the beautiful things around her: the sight lover does 
not have the capacity to see these beautiful items as instances of the Form of 
Beauty.  It is a short step then to the type of mistake that the sight lover commits in 
the second example, namely mistaking the instances of Beauty for Beauty itself.  If 
she cannot see the instances of Beauty for the instances they are, the implication 
must be, she comes to think of them as all the beauty there is, and so, as Beauty 
itself.  Hence, and this is what is of significance for understanding the state of 
dreaming, lacking the concept and knowledge of the Form of Beauty leads to a 
misconception about the instances of Beauty.  One’s grasp of the many beautiful 
things is altered when one conceives of them as instances of a Form.  So the sight 
lovers, not only luck the cognitive capacity of knowledge, but due to this lack their 
other cognitive function, belief, operates deficiently.  The many instances are 
misidentified and miscomprehended, and this is the best that the sight lover can do.  
Plato says that, by contrast: 
someone who … believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things 
that participate in it and doesn't believe that the participants are it or that it 
itself is the participants.  (476c9-d4)   
 
In this case, one’s knowledge informs one’s system of beliefs.  The result is a re-
identification of their contents.   
   
The Objects of Knowledge, Belief, and Ignorance 
The main part of Knowledge-Belief Argument is the sub-argument for the 
distinctness of the cognitive powers from each other, and the correlation of each to 
its objects.  Plato gives as a principle for the identity of powers two conditions: 
what the objects of a power are, and what the operation of the power on its objects 
is (477c9-d).   
 
The object of knowledge is that which completely is (477a3, 7).  The object of 
belief that which is and is not, which participates in being and in not being (478d6, 
e1-2, 479c7, d4-5).  Finally the object of ignorance is what in no way is (477a3-4, 
7).  Before discussing the ontology of the objects of the cognitive powers, and the 
nature of each of these powers, I will make a brief comment about ignorance.   
 
Plato does not discuss or describe ignorance in the detail that he devotes to 
knowledge and opinion.  Because of this, most commentators assume that he drops 
ignorance soon after introducing it, and in consequence they do not discuss in any 
detail the ontological status of the object of ignorance, namely what in no way is.  It 
is true that Plato may have introduced ignorance for symmetry, to use it towards the 
demarcation of the objects of belief as between being and non-being, rather than 
because he deems it a cognitive power in its own right.  Nevertheless, he reckons it 
such, as is clear from his language when he talks of the objects that knowledge and 
ignorance are set over (478c3-4).  But the legitimacy of countenancing ignorance as 
a power is a different matter from the significance of the objects of ignorance for 
ontology presented in this argument, to which we shall come to presently.   
 
Plato says the following for the identity conditions of a power: 
In the case of a power, I use only what it is set over and what it does, and by 
reference to these I call each the power it is: What is set over the same things 
and does the same I call the same power; what is set over something different 
and does something different I call a different one (477c9-d5).   
 
It follows that different powers have different objects.  But there is a textual 
ambiguity here in the expression ‘something different’.  Are different things 
distinct, in the way that colours are from sounds, or can they overlap while still 
being different, like fours year olds and boys?  The difference between the two is 
important because if there is an overlap between the objects of knowledge and the 
objects of belief, then there could be items we can believe or know, such as true 
beliefs.  This is the reading of the passage favoured by Gail Fine.
3
  Despite the fact 
that the text never becomes explicit about this, I find that there are powerful 
considerations in favour of the non-overlap of the objects of knowledge and the 
objects of belief, to which we shall come in what follows.   
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The question of the objects of the three cognitive powers in the present argument 
has attracted much attention in the literature.  The key question is the way in which 
one is to understand the Greek expressions for ‘being’ and ‘not being’ (on, being; 
esti, is; me on, not being; and ouk esti, is not).  Three main interpretations have 
been discussed in the literature, the existential, the veridical, and the predicative 
one.   According to the existential interpretation, ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are to be 
understood as claiming that something exists, does not exist, while ‘being’ and ‘not 
being’ are to be understood as the existent and the non existent.  Such a reading is 
thought to commit Plato to varying degrees of existence, with the Forms being at 
the highest level, the many things in the perceptible world being at the intermediate 
level – existing to a lesser degree – with the scale ending at the non existent.  
According to the veridical interpretation, the four expressions above would 
correspondingly be understood as asserting that something is true, not true, and 
describing the true and the non true.  Both interpretations face difficulties with the 
text of the argument in Republic V, which have been described in detail and 




The third interpretation of the knowledge-belief argument is the predicative one, 
according to which ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are understood as incomplete occurrences of 
predications of the form 'is f’ and 'is not f’, where f stands for such terms as 'good', 
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'beautiful', etc.  ‘Being’ and ‘not being’ are to be understood as referring to that 
which is f in every sense, and that which is in no way f.  Annas argues for this 
interpretation and offers a reading of the knowledge-belief argument by 
understanding the terms in question in the predicative sense.
5
   
 
Although certain sections of the knowledge-belief argument are rendered readily 
intelligible on the predicative reading, I believe that we run into serious difficulties 
if we try to understand the whole argument along these lines.  The major difficulty 
that faces an overall predicative interpretation is that it results in assigning the very 
same entities as objects of knowledge and ignorance.  As we have seen, Plato holds 
that two capacities that are different exercise different powers and have different 
objects.  He has further argued that knowledge and ignorance are different, and 
hence, have different objects (477e9-478a5).  The object of knowledge is that 
which fully is, while that of ignorance that which in no way is.   
 
To see that on the predicative interpretation knowledge is assigned the same objects 
as ignorance, we should look at Annas' account of knowledge and ignorance in 
some detail.   
She says:   
Knowledge, then is of what really is whatever it is.  Knowledge without 
qualification is of what is what it is without qualification.  ...  Ignorance, the 
opposed state, is of what is not in any way -- that is, completely lacks the 
feature ascribed to it.  ...  To be ignorant of something is to miss the mark 
completely. (p. 201)   
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So in knowledge, the characteristic we ascribe to x is possessed by x in every way.  
Thus, the form of Beauty is beautiful in every sense of the term, under any 
circumstances, from all perspectives.  On the other hand, in ignorance, the 
characteristic we ascribe to x is not possessed by x in any way.  If it is possessed in 
some way, then x will be an object of belief, since "belief involves having 
something right about its object". (p. 201)  Inevitably, then, the objects of ignorance 
must be such as to be capable of not possessing a characteristic in any sense, under 
any circumstances, from any perspective.  Annas does not offer any examples of 
objects of ignorance, but it follows that the Forms are the only objects qualified for 
it, since they do not possess the opposites in any way; saying that the From of 
Beauty is ugly completely misses the mark.  Annas’s criterion for the objects of 
ignorance is explicit about this: "Something is the object of my ignorance if it 
totally lacks the quality I predicate of it, just as it is the object of my knowledge if it 
has that quality in a way excluding error about it" (p. 201).  But the objects of 
knowledge need to be different from the objects of ignorance, since the knowledge-
belief argument clearly requires this (477a3-5).   
 
My reading of the ontology of the objects of the three powers combines the 
existential and the predicative interpretations.  The easiest way to describe it is to 
compare the objects of each power to sunlight.  Sunlight is composed of rays of 
different bands of wavelength.  When all the bands are present, we have what we 
call natural sunlight.  If some bands are filtered away the remaining light acquires 
different colorations.  If all the bands are filtered away, nothing remains.  What is 
interesting about the sunlight paradigm is, on the one hand, that it is possible for all 
the bands of wavelength to be compresent or to be separated.  This corresponds, for 
example, to all the senses of beauty being compresent in the form of Beauty, which 
the argument requires of the object of knowledge by contrast to the objects of 
belief.  On the other hand, in the sunlight paradigm ontological differences are 
reflected in qualitative differences, so that filtering away bands of rays diminishes 
ontologically the constitution of the sunlight, but at the same time it changes the 
colour of the light.  Let us now consider beauty.  About the object of knowledge, 
Plato says that it is what is completely, while for the object of belief he says that it 
is what participates in both being and not being (477a3, 479a1-c5).  Taken 
existentially, without adopting the degrees of existence reading of it, one can think 
of them as follows: the object of knowledge has a full constitution, like the natural 
sunlight, while the object of belief has a depleted constitution, like e.g. blue light.  
Both of them are, but the object of belief is missing ontological constituents which 
are present in the object of knowledge.  And this makes it qualitatively different 
from the object of knowledge.  But what constituents could these be that somehow 
thin-out the object of belief by their absence?   
 
These constituents that differentiate the object of belief from the object of 
knowledge could not be any chance features that the object of belief does not 
happen to possess.  Every entity fails to possess features possessed by other entities, 
and will always do so since many features are mutually incompatible.  But we have 
an indication from Plato what the relevant features are.  In the sub-argument about 
the object of belief, Plato first tells us that the object of belief is and is not (478d5-
e10), and it ‘participates in both being and not being and cannot correctly be called 
purely one or the other’ (478e1-3).  He then proceeds to show that the many things 
around us are and are not what we take them to be (478e7-479c5), and concludes 
that the many are indeed the objects of belief, in between being and non being 
(479c6-d10).  So the key aspect of this ontology that concerns us here is the sense 
in which the many are and are not. 
  
Plato tells us the following:  
Of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also appear ugly? Or 
is there one of all those just things that will not also appear unjust?  Or one of 
those impious things that will not also appear impious?   
There isn’t one, for it is necessary that they appear to be beautiful in a way and 
also to be ugly in a way, and the same with the other things you asked about.  
(479a5-8)   
 
We should not assume that the use of the verb ‘appear’ indicates that what is and is 
not does not concern the constitution of each thing but only its appearance.  
Because immediately after this passage Plato concludes in purely ontological 
terminology: 
So, with the many bigs and smalls and lights and heavies, is any one of them, 
any more the thing someone says it is than its opposite?   
No, each of them always participates in both opposites.   
Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not 
what he says it is?  [my emphasis]  (479b6-10)   
 
So, the many beautiful things are beautiful and ugly, and the many just things are 
just and unjust.  This is what it is for them to be and not to be, and this is what 
places them in between being and non being:  
can you find a more appropriate place to put them than intermediate between 
being and not being?   
they are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely 
is.  (479c6-d5) 
 
So a thing that is beautiful is also not beautiful because it is ugly as well.  What the 
thing is missing is some features of beauty, and so in these respects it is ugly.  By 
contrast, the Form of Beauty is not missing any of that.  It is beautiful in every 
respect and has no trace of ugliness within it.  So, from this point of view, the Form 
of Beauty has all the features or ways of being beautiful, while any one of the many 
beautifuls lacks several of these features.  Extrapolating on the same line of 
thinking, starting from the Form of Beauty and taking away all the features of being 
beautiful that constitute the ways that the Form of Beauty is beautiful, it makes 
sense to assume that one is left with nothing.  I believe this is the reasoning that that 
Plato follows in this passage: a Form F consists of all the features of being f, in 
every sense and respect of f-ness; the f things in the world possess f-ness in some 
respects of f-ness, but not in every respect; they therefore lack, in their constitution, 
some of the features that make up the Form F, which is why they are also not f; 
finally, if all the features of being f that constitute the Form of F are lacking, then 
there is total absence of F-ness.   
 
Is there a confusion here between non-f-ness and nothingness?  No; that such a 
confusion is avoided can be seen if we think of the above along the following lines: 
Consider a world in which what there is are the Forms.  Assume that there are 
Forms only for positive characterisations – however we demarcate them; for 
example, there is a Form of Beauty, of Justice, of Heat, but not of Ugliness, 
Injustice, Cold, etc.  Finally, the things in that world are composed of partakings in 
the Forms, only that each thing, by partaking in a Form F, acquires only some 
features of the features of the Form, and in that sense they become f but also not-f, 
because they lack some of the features of f-ness.  So, each thing could be thought of 
as being composed of the partial presence of each of several Forms in it.  Thus, 
there are entities, namely the Forms, each of which is consists in the full presence 
of what there is; and there are the things which are composed of the partial presence 
of what there is – the many things, each of which is made up of aspects of each 
Form.  Thinking of the world in these terms, one can describe the two realms as the 
full presence, and the partial presence of the characters that Forms embody.  Taking 
a further step in the same direction, from full presence to partial presence of a 
Form, and from partial presence to eventual absence, by depletion of its constitution 
if none of the features that compose each Form are present.  This latter would be the 
third realm, of complete non-being.   
 
Such a world makes sense of the claims that Plato is putting forward in the 
Knowledge-Belief Argument.  It shows that Plato is not confused about being non-f 
and non-being in the existential sense.  He is putting forward a conception of the 
world that may be captured in terms of the presence, the partial presence, and the 
absence of characters.  There are two rules in that world.  First, there are no 
opposite characters; second, partial presence of a character is possible only when 
several characters combine together.  The first rule tells us that given any character, 
there is no character opposite to it.  Rather, to be non-f is to lack some of the 
features of character F; but this can be the case only when character F is partially 
present, and hence only when the character is present in combination with other 
characters.  Therefore, importantly, only combinations – i.e. the many things – can 
be non-f.  So in this world, there is no character of Ugliness, and only the many can 
be ugly, because of the partial presence of Beauty in them.  Finally, although partial 
absence of a character results in the thing being non-f, stripping away all the 
features of a character F from F results in nothingness, not the opposite character – 
non-F-ness.  So there are three ontological realms: that of the full presence of 
Forms; that of the partial presence of Forms; and that of the absence of Forms.  
Every Form F is f in every way of being f; while the many things are composed of 
the partial presence of Forms, and are f in some respects, for each partially present 
Form F, but they are also not-f in other respects.   
 
The Fallibility of Belief 
We have so far explained the challenging combination of Plato’s claims that the 
many are each beautiful and ugly, and that because of this they lie in between 
complete being and nothingness.  This enables us to now understand the fallibility 
of belief.  The many are the objects of belief; knowledge and belief operate 
differently on their objects:  
A moment ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion aren't the same.  
How could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power is the 
same as an infallible one?  (477e4-7)   
Why is belief fallible?  How does it go wrong?  It is the nature of the objects that 
will show us this.  Since it has been established that no one ‘of the manys [is] what 
someone says it is any more than it is not what he says it is’ (479d9-10), it follows 
that in every predication the speaker gets something wrong.  Every characterisation 
we make of the many objects, say that the house is beautiful, is partly wrong, 
because there are always senses of the predicate term which are not true of the 
subject.  This is the sense in which belief is fallible: every such statement about the 
many is partly true and partly false.  There are no true, or even false beliefs, as 
such.  All beliefs are partly true and partly false.   
 
It might be thought that the fallibility of belief could be avoided by simply claiming 
in every predication about the many, that a thing is and is not f; the house is and is 
not beautiful.  We should expect that this statement would be true, and the 
corresponding belief, also.  But Plato anticipates this and precludes it: the many are 
‘like the ambiguities  … and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or 
fixedly not being or as both or as neither’ (479b9-c5).  Why are the many not 
simply both being and non being, e.g. being just and unjust?  There are two factors 
that could be at play here, depending on how we understand the term ‘pagis’ in 
479c4.  If we follow the translator
6
 here, and understand it as ‘fixedly’, then the 
answer would be that Plato seems to be making the assumption that the many are in 
constant flux, which would be a familiar Platonic position for the world of 
experience.  On this reading, Plato is saying that the many are not fixedly being or 
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fixedly not being, since nothing is fixed in one state.  This reading could be 
extended to the case of the many being both being or not being, or neither, if we 
take the scope of ‘fixedly’ to include the remainder of the sentence.  In this sense, 
the many would not be fixedly being and not being, nor fixedly neither, because 
they are in flux.  This reading is reinforced by Plato’s describing the many as 
‘rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely is’ (my 
emphasis, 479d3-5).  This  seems to suggest that he conceives of the many as being 
in constant flux with respect to the possession of a property.   
 
Although this reading might be part of the intended meaning, it cannot be the whole 
explanation of the fallibility in the way of belief operates, as it derives the fallibility 
without any reference to the way belief does what it does, but only in terms of the 
ontology of its objects.  But if we take ‘pagis’ to mean what Liddell and Scott give 
as its meaning for this occurrence, and a second one at Republic 434d2, namely as 
meaning ‘without reservations’, then a second reading is possible.  With this 
meaning, the passage reads as follows: ‘one cannot understand them [the many] as 
being or not being, without reservations, or as both or as neither’ (479c3-5).  This 
allows for the reservations not to be stemming only from the ontological state of 
flux of the many, but also from the way that belief operates.   
 
What suggests this second consideration is the following statement:  
Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not 
what he says it is?   
No, they are like the ambiguities one is entertained with at dinner parties … 
(479b9-11)   
 
Here Plato is reflecting on the way a statement relates to the thing it is about: what 
someone says about something, and how what he says relates to the way the thing 
is.  He seems to have the intuition that language cannot capture with precision what 
is the case in the world of the many.  Language cannot carve out a predicate so as to 
capture just what is true about something in the world and exclude what is not true.  
We cannot describe precisely what is beautiful about Nefertiti and what is not.  
Language is not complex enough, and probably our cognitive capacities are not 
discriminating enough either to be up to the task.  It follows that the way that our 
statements relate to the world of the many is by making broad contact with it, 
attributing characterisations in brush strokes which do not match precisely what is 
the case, but spreading over whole the whole of each of the many, indiscriminately 
applying to truth makers and falsity makers within it.   
 
But the poor fit between language and the world of the many is not a result of the 
inadequate design of language.  Language is well designed, but for the world of the 
Forms, not the world of the many.  The poor fit is between the world of the Forms 
and the world of the many, because the Forms are fully present in the one and only 
partially present in the other.  Language describes each Form as just, beautiful, 
pious, etc., respectively, without any reservations about applicable senses of the 
terms.  In consequence, language cannot serve to describe the many, since the 
Forms are only partially present in that world and language does not possess 
appropriately modified terms.   
 
Conclusion 
Plato distinguishes between knowledge and belief as different powers that operate 
in different ways on their objects.  He does not develop the theory enough to show 
how each power operates, and hence does not explain how their operation makes 
the one infallible and the other fallible.  What is significant about the treatment of 
knowledge and belief in Republic V is the intuitions about these concepts that Plato 
reveals in it.  The first is that knowledge and belief are powers.  This is very 
different from the craft analogy of the earlier dialogues for moral knowledge, which 
I will not discuss in the present paper.  The second intuition is that they are different 
powers, and the one can operate independently of the other.  Hence neither is 
analysable through the other.  The third intuition is that knowledge and belief have 
different objects, as sight and hearing do.  This is the most alien element of the 
theory to our own conception of the objects of knowledge and belief.  One can 
begin to find it acceptable only if one thinks of the object of knowledge as being 
individuated by the process through which knowledge reaches it.  This is not to 
suggest that knowledge creates the world, but that different mining methods extract 
different materials, even if the difference is in the degree of purity.  Finally, 
knowledge can affect belief by placing the objects of belief in a different 
ontological perspective.   
 
 
  
 
